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1 Introduction 
The aim of this paper is to argue that update semantics is a natural framework 
for contextually restricted quantification, and to illustrate its use in the analysis of 
anaphoric definite descriptions and certain other anaphoric terms. 
The present discussion remains at an informal level, but takes place against 
the background of the system of update semantics for the language of modal predicate 
logic as presented in [4, 6]. The theoretical notions that are used rather casually in 
the present paper are intended to be in accordance with the formal ones defined in 
those earlier papers. As for the additions to the system particular to the paper at 
hand, their formal rendering has to be deferred to another occasion. 
On the descriptive level, the paper focusses on (singular) anaphoric definite 
descriptions. The suggestion made here, is to treat them-together with certain other 
anaphoric terms-as quantifiers, where quantification is dynamic and contextually 
restricted. 
We share the philosophy of Neale [9] and Ludlow and Neale [8] , who defend 
a uniform Russellian, i .e., a quantificational analysis of the semantics of definites 
and indefinites, explaining apparent non-quantificational aspects in (epistemic) prag­
matic terms. Our contribution to this stock of ideas, is to look upon quantification as 
being of a dynamic nature-in order to account for binding relations across the syn­
tactic scope of quantifiers-, and, when suitable, restricted to context sets-in order 
to make sense of the uniqueness preconditions of anaphoric definite descriptions, 
and the preconditions of other kinds of anaphoric terms. 1  
The point of  view that (anaphoric) definite descriptions involve context de­
pendent quantification is not new, of course. We hope to show, though, that update 
semantics allows a natural explication of the way in which the contextually deter­
mined domains of quantification come about, an aspect which, combined with its 
dynamic quantificational mechanism, allows an easy switch between absolute and 
restricted quantification. 
We will also present some arguments against an alternative approach to ana­
phoric definite descriptions, which accounts for their anaphoric nature by coindexing 
them with a specific term in the context. We will provide some examples which 
are intended to show that-at least in some cases--<oindexing cannot do the job, 
whereas contextually restricted quantification can. As it seems to be the case that in 
those cases where coindexing does work, contextually restricted dynamic quantifi­
cation can also be used, we venture the hypothesis that the latter is to be preferred 
as a general mechanism.2 
However, the empirical field of definites and anaphors is  vast and treacher­
ous. Here, we can only scratch the surface, and deal with a few, relatively simple 
examples. Further research is called for to take the hypothesis to the test. 
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2 Context and Information 
Update semantics takes a radical stand on the context dependent nature of interpre­
tation. The meaning of a sentence is identified with its context change potential . 
Contexts are taken to be infonnation states. Hence, meanings are looked upon as 
update functions on infonnation states. Thus, interpretation creates context. At the 
same time, the updates constituted by sentences are often partial functions: in order 
to produce output, they may put constraints on the input. In the dynamic process of 
interpretation, the making and the making use of the context go hand in hand. 
Infonnation states contain two kinds of infonnation: infonnation about the 
world, and discourse infonnation. In the end, it is infonnation about the world that 
counts, but in acquiring such infonnation through discourse, one also has to store 
infonnation pertaining to the discourse as such. For example, in order to be able 
to resolve anaphoric links across utterances, one has to keep track of the discourse 
items. At present, this is the only kind of discourse infonnation we take into account. 
Infonnation states are defined as sets of possibilities, where possibilities 
consist of a possible world, a referent system, and an assignment which links the 
discourse infonnation represented in the referent system to infonnation about the 
world. 
The possible worlds which are present in an agent's infonnation state should 
be looked upon as alternative ways the world could be as far as the partial infonnation 
of the agent goes. As infonnation about the world grows, some such alternatives 
will be eliminated. According to this picture, growth of infonnation about the world 
amounts to elimination of p.ossibilities. 
In an initial infonnation state no discourse has started yet. The possibilities 
in an initial state only consist of a possible world. The referent system, and hence the 
assignments, are still empty. They get fiIled as discourse goes on: discourse items are 
added to the referent system, and objects are assigned to them as possible referents. 
Final states are like initial states. Once a discourse is finished, discourse infonnation 
is of no further use, and can be discarded. Similarly, parts of discourse-even certain 
parts of a single sentence�an create local discourse infonnation which is erased 
after the interpretation of that part is completed. 
For the purpose of illustration, infonnation states can be depicted as simple 
matrices, as is shown in the figures below. Each row in the matrix corresponds to a 
possibility in the infonnation state. The first position in each row is reserved for the 
possible world in that possibility.3 
The other columns in the matrix concern discourse infonnation, and are 
added one by one as the discourse goes on. They can also be deleted again, when 
the (relevant part of) the discourse is closed off. Each column corresponds to a 
particular discourse item, introduced by a tenn in the discourse.4 
The assignment function in each possibility fills the fields in the correspond­
ing row. Each field contains an object (from the domain of the world in that pos­
sibility), which is a possible value of the discourse item in question, given the way 
things are in the possible world in that possibility, and given the values of the other 
items in that possibility. 
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One and the same item may have alternative possible values with respect 
to one and the same world, and the particular values already assigned to earlier 
items. This means that one and the same world may figure in two or more different 
possibilities.5 
In the figures that follow it is illustrated how information extends as discourse 
proceeds: In going from one state to the next, new items may be added, where each 
possibility in the new state is an extension of some possibility already present in the 
old state. One possibility in the old state may subsist in more than one extension 
in the new state. But it may also happen that certain possibilities in the old state 
are eliminated, and do not subsist in the new state. In particular, (all possibilities 
containing) a world may disappear, which means that we have learned something­
albeit not necessarily something true-about the way the world is. 
3 A Man 
Suppose an agent has the following information: Either no man walks in the park, or 
only Alf does, or both Alf and Bill do, or all men in the domain of discourse-Alf, 
Bill and Chris-are strolling there. Furthermore, one has the information that only 
Bill is wearing blue suede shoes.6 
If these are the only relevant pieces of information, the information state of 
the agent can be depicted as in Figure 1 a, a one-dimensional matrix just consisting 
of four possible worlds. (The subscripts are used as a mnemonic device, to indicate 
how many men are walking in the park.) 
Now suppose the agent is told the following: 
( I )  A man i s  walking in the park. 
The initial information state depicted in Figure l a  is transformed into state l c, where 
the intermediate state 1 b exemplifies the effects of processing the indefinite term a 
man. 
Indefinites involve existential quantification, one of the dynamic effects of 
which is the introduction of a new discourse item in the information state, i .e. ,  the 
addition of a new column to the matrix. With respect to each possibility in the initial 
state, there are three possible values to assign to the new field, since there are three 
men in the domain of discourse. So, for each of the four possibilities in la, we 
obtain three extensions in the intermediate state 1 b, one for each man in the domain 
of discourse. 
Processing the remaining predicative part of the sentence results in the elim­
ination of possibilities in which the man that is the value of the new field, is not 
walking in the park in the world of that possibility. This means that in the resulting 
state I e, world wo-the world in which no man walks in the park-gets out of the 
picture. And each of the other three possibilities in the initial state subsist in as many 
extensions as there are men walking in the park in the world of that possibility, with 
one of those men as a possible value of the newly introduced discourse item. 




WI Alf WI Alf 
WI Bill W2 Alf 
WI Chris W2 Bill 
W2 Alf W3 Alf 
W2 Bill W3 Bill 
W2 Chris W3 Chris 
(a) W3 Alf 
W3 Bill (c) 
W3 Chris 
(b) 
Figure 1 :  [Initial state] (a) A man (b) walks in the park. (c) 
4 Context Sets 
As is clear from the way they are depicted, information states naturally come with 
a contextually restricted domain of discourse. Not only is there in each possibility 
a global domain of discourse, consisting of all the objects that live in the world of 
that possibility; but furthermore there is the restricted set of the objects which in that 
possibility are the values of.the discourse items. This set is called the context set of 
that possibility. 
For example, in the states depicted in Figure 2 below, the context set consists 
in each possibility of a single individual. And in the states depicted in Figures 3b 
and 3c, the context set in each possibility consists of two objects. 
Quantification restricted to context sets was first introduced and studied in 
WesterstMlI [ 10] .  Westerstahl stresses the point that a context set is to be distin­
guished from a universe of discourse. The former, unlike the latter, is not constant 
over pieces of discourses. WesterstMlI only considers "the formal framework for 
context sets, leaving (the more difficult) question of how context sets are chosen to 
more ambitious semantic theories". 
In the present set-up, context sets are not subject to choice, but are constructed 
(and deconstructed) in a deterministic fashion through the interpretation procedures. 
In principle there is a choice to be made when one meets a term in the text: between 
absolute and contextually restricted quantification. But once one has opted for the 
latter, the relevant context sets are simply provided by the contents of the information 
state at that point, leaving no further choice. 
The context sets do have the characteristic features of being relatively small 
and in constant flux, because they depend on the discourse items, which have a 
relatively short life span. 
The fact that information states come with context sets can be used to interpret 
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anaphoric tenns as contextually restricted quantifiers. The general picture is as 
follows. 
The update associated with an anaphoric tenn is characteristically partial and 
comes with a precondition, making a certain requirement on the actual contents of 
the context sets of the possibilities of the input state. Either the state has to already 
support the requirement, or-in case accommodation is permitted-it should be 
consistent with it, i .e., it should be possible to update the state in such a way that 
afterwards it meets the requirement. 
If the state can not (be made to) meet the precondition, the interpretation 
procedure aborts. If it can, the process continues along the following lines. The 
referent system is extended with a new discourse item, and the possible values of 
the new item are determined relative to the objects in the context sets, in a way 
which depends on the quantificational nature and the descriptive content of the term. 
Invariably, if it succeeds, the procedure as a whole will output a real extension of 
the input state. 
5 The Man 
As for anaphoric definite description, they have as their precondition that within 
the context set of each possibility, i.e., among the values of the discourse items in 
that possibility, there is a unique object that satisfies its descriptive content. If this 
condition can not be fulfilled, the updating proces comes to a halt. If it can, the 
definite description introduces a new discourse item, and in each possibility, the 
value of the new item is the·unique object in the context set that satisfies the content 
of the description.7 
Note that the uniqueness requirement is far from absolute. Not only is it not 
required that in the world there is a unique object that satisfies the content of the 
description (as absolute quantification would require), even among all the possible 
values of the discourse items in the state as a whole, there may be many such objects, 
also with respect to a single possible world. 
Following this recipe, updating the state depicted in Figure 2a-the result 
of updating the sample infonnation state with sentence (I )-with sentence (2), will 
lead to the state 2c, via the intennediary state 2b, which is the result of processing 
the anaphoric definite the man. 
(2) The man is wearing blue suede shoes. 
The man that is being talked about has to be Bill, since according to the infonnation 
of the agent, Bill is the only one wearing blue suede shoes. (But Bill is not the only 
man, nor the only man walking in the park.) 
Notice the following. The definite description itself introduces a new dis­
course item. In the present case, this may seem of little use, since the two discourse 
items are completely indistinguishable: In each possibility in the infonnation state 
the two items have the same value. And from here on, they will behave as if they 
were one and the same. We will meet other cases, though, where the introduction 
of a new item by an (anaphoric) definite description will turn out to be essential .s 
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W I  Alf WI Alf Alf 
W2 Alf W2 Alf Alf 
W2 Bill W2 Bill Bill 
W3 Alf W3 Alf Alf 
W3 Bill W3 Bill Bill 
W3 Chris W3 Chris Chris (c) 
(a) (b) 
Figure 2: A man walks in the park. (a) The man (b) wears blue suede shoes. (c) 
Notice also that in dealing with the example, no use is made of a coindexing 
mechanism. The anaphoric. definite description picks up its antecedent solely via 
its quantificational force and its descriptive content. Again, in this particular case, 
one might just have weIl have used a coindexing mechanism, linking the definite 
explicitly with a particular discourse item introduced earlier. However, as we will 
see shortly, in general the two procedures make a difference. 
6 Some Donkeys 
Heim ( [7], p. 226-9) puts forward the foIlowing two examples as primafacie prob­
lems for a RusseIlian, i.e., for a quantificational account of (anaphoric) definite 
descriptions: 
(3) If a man beats a donkey, the donkey kicks him 
(4) Every boy who likes his mother visits her for Christmas 
The difficulty with (3) is how to make sense of the uniqueness that a quantificational 
approach would require. The problem with (4) is how the definite his mother is to 
bind the pronoun her, which is outside its syntactic scope. 
Given a dynamic approach to quantification, the second type of example can 
be dealt with straightforwardly by treating his mother as a dynamic quantifier, thus 
extending its binding force beyond its syntactic scope. Notice by the way that this 
quantifier is  absolute here: for each possible value of the pronominal element which 
it contains, uniqueness is satisfied in the world, not just relative to a context set. 
So, we concentrate on the first type of example. Sentence (3) is a conditional. 
Processing a conditional involves comparing three states: the input state, the input 
state hypothetically updated with the antecedent, and the state that results from a 
further hypothetical update with the consequent. 
The update of a conditional sentence as a whole is purely eliminative: the 
output state will be a subset of the input state. I.e., after having processed the 
conditional as a whole, no new discourse items will have been added. New items 
may be introduced while the procedure is running, but at the end they will have 
been deleted again. The effect of an update with a conditional is that a possibility is 
eliminated from the input state unless all its extensions in the state that results after 
updating with the antecedent, survive a further update with the consequent.9 
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WI Alf Heehaw 
WI Chris Heehaw 
W2 AIf Heehaw 
W2 Alf Eeyore 
W2 Chris Heehaw 
W3 AIf Heehaw 
W3 Alf Eeyore 
(a) W3 Chris Heehaw 
WI Alf Heehaw Heehaw Alf 
WI Chris Heehaw Heehaw Chris 
W2 Alf Heehaw Heehaw Alf 
W2 Chris Heehaw Heehaw Chris 
W3 Alf Heehaw Heehaw AIf 
W3 AIf Eeyore Eeyore Alf 
W3 Chris Heehaw Heehaw Chris (d) 
(c) 
Figure 3: [Initial state] (a) [hyp.] a man beats a donkey (b) [hyp.] the donkey kicks 
him. (c) If a man beats a donkey, the donkey kicks him. (d) 
Suppose that an agent has the following information: Either no man beats 
donkeys, or both Alf and Chris beat Heehaw, and besides, maybe Alf beats Eeyore, 
too, maybe not. Fortunately, surely no more beating is going on. (Guys wearing 
blue suede shoes don't do things like that.) Concerning the donkeys, Heehaw is 
known to be of the kind that kicks back when beaten, about Eeyore information 
pertaining to his behaviour under such circumstances is lacking. 
In case this is the only relevant information, the initial state of the agent 
reckons with four possible worlds. The state can be depicted as in Figure 3a. (The 
higher the subscript, the more violence is going on.) 
In evaluating (3), we subsequently update this state with the antecedent a man 
beats a donkey and the consequent the donkey kicks him. The results are depicted 
in Figure 3b and 3c, respectively. Testing the initial state with respect to these two 
hypothetical states in the way described above, leads to the final state 3d. World 
W2-the world in which Alf beats both donkeys, but in which Eeyore is not kicking 
back-is eliminated. Of the three extensions it had in the state after updating with 
the antecedent, only two survived a further update with the consequent. Hence, in 
the final state, those possible worlds will have remained, in which for every man and 
every donkey such that the man beats the donkey, that donkey kicks that man . 
So, using contextually restricted quantification, we meet no problem in in-
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terpreting the anaphoric definite description as a quantifier. And note that the kind 
of uniqueness it requires does not preclude that a man beats more than one donkey. 
Such possibilities simple survive, provided the vilain is kicked back by every poor 
beast. 10 
This means that sentence (3),  at least when taken as an initial piece of dis­
course, is equivalent with: 
(5) If a man beats a donkey, it kicks him. 
Whether or not (5) is fully equivalent with (3), independent of where in the discourse 
it occurs, is a question which is not easy to answer. I I  
7 Another Man 
Not only definite descriptions can be anaphoric, virtually any quantifier can be used 
in an anaphoric way. The indefinite determiner another is a clear case of a quantifier 
that can only be interpreted by relating it to context sets. Consider: 
(6) A man is walking in the park. Another man is walking in the park, too. 
Contextual dependence comes in at several points. First of all, there is the precon­
dition that in every possibility there should be at least one man in the context set of 
that possibility. If not, the interpretation process comes to a halt. If this precondi­
tion is met, the state is extended with a new discourse item, the value of which in 
a possibility is to be a man from the global domain of discourse, which is not yet 
a member of the context set of that possibility. How many extensions result in the 
new state for each old possibility depends on how many such men there are. 
Hence, in our sample state-as it was specified in section 3-, which after 
an update with the first sentence of (6) results in the state depicted in Figure 4a, a 
further update with the second sentence of (6) leads via 4b, presenting the effect 
of processing the anaphoric indefinite another man, to 4c. Note that world wI-in 
which only one man walks in the park-has been eliminated. (Just as W2 would be 
eliminated if we repeat the last sentence of (6) once more.) 
Note that in this case, too, no coindexing is used to account for the anaphoric 
link. In fact it is hard to imagine how one could call upon coindexing as a way to 
account for this kind of anaphoric relation. (Coindexing seems particularly unsuited 
to deal with iterated uses of another . . .  (yet) another . . . .  )
The two discourse items that are present in the information state obtained 
after processing (6) have a special feature. They are quantitatively distinct: In each 
possibility they have a different value. But they are qualitatively indistinguishable: 
For each possibility in which the two items have a particular value, there is another 
possibility which is the same, except for the fact that the values of the two items are 
interchanged. 12 
The fact that the items introduced in (6) by the indefinite terms a man and 
another man are quantitatively different, but qualitatitively equal, explains why one 
cannot refer back to a particular one of the two men involved using a singular 
anaphoric definite description. 1 3  
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WI AIf Bill 
WI AIf Chris 
W2 AIf Bill W2 AIf Bill 
WI Alf W2 AIf Chris W2 B ill Alf 
W2 Alf W2 Bill AIf W3 AIf BilI 
W2 Bill W2 Bill Chris W3 AIf Chris 
W3 Alf W3 Alf Bill W3 Bill Alf 
W3 Bill W3 AIf Chris W3 Bill Chris 
W3 Chris W3 Bill AIf W3 Chris Alf 
W3 Bill Chris W3 Chris Bill 
(a) W3 Chris AIf 
W3 Chris Bill (c) 
(b) 
W2 AIf Bill AIf Bill 
W2 Alf Bill Bill AIf 
W2 Bill Alf Bill Alf 
W2 Bill AIf AJf Bill 
W3 AIf Bill Alf Bill 
W3 AIf Bill Bill AIf W2 Alf Bill B ill  AIf 
W3 Alf Chris Alf Chris W2 Bill AIf Bill Alf 
W3 Alf Chris Chris AIf W3 Bill AIf Bill Alf 
W3 Bill Alf Bill Alf W3 Alf Bill Bill Alf 
W3 Bill AIf Alf Bill W3 Bill Chris Bill Chris 
W3 Bill Chris BilI Chris W3 Chris Bill Bill Chris 
W3 Bill Chris Chris Bill 
W3 Chris AIf Chris Alf (e) 
W3 Chris Alf Alf Chris 
W3 Chris Bill Chris Bill 
W3 Chris Bill BilI Chris 
(d) 
Figure 4: A man walks in the park. (a) Another man (b) walks in the park, too. (c) 
The one . . .  the other . . . .  (d) . . .  wears blue suede shoes . . .  does not. (e) 
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8 The One and the Other 
Of course, it is possible to continue (6) and by anaphoric means refer to each of the 
two men separately. However, such anaphoric reference is to neither of the two men 
in particular. One way to do so is as follows: 14 
(7) The one is wearing blue suede shoes, the other is not. 
We treat the one . . .  the other . . . as a polyadic quantifier. Its precondition is that 
the context set of each possibility consists of two different objects which satisfy the 
descriptive content of the quantifier, which in this particular case is empty. Le., the 
precondition makes use of the only aspect that distinguishes between the two men: 
that they are quantitatively distinct. 
If the precondition is met, two new discourse items are added, and for each 
old possibility, we end up with two new ones: one extension in which in the field of 
the two new items we find the values of the two old items in the same order, and one 
in which we find them in the two new fields in the reverse order. (See Figure 4d.) 
Note that it is impossible to coindex one of the elements of the polyadic 
definite with one of the two preceding indefinites specifically. In the particular case 
of (6) followed by (7), this may seem of little importance, precisely because the 
two items introduced by (6) are quantitatively indistinguishable. However that in 
general the procedure has to be as it was described above, is obvious from the simpler 
example: 
(8) Alfred is walking in the park. Bill is walking in the park, too. The one is 
wearing a hat, the other is not. 
In interpreting the last sentence one can not associate one of the items introduced by 
the polyadic definite with either the item introduced by the name Alfred, or the one 
associated with the name Bill. Unless, that is, we know which of the two actually 
is wearing a hat. But the lack of this information does not prevent one from being 
able to process this sequence of sentences. However, if we had to coindex each of 
the elements of the polyadic quantifier with one particular item in the context, the 
un interpretability of this sequence would in fact ensue. 
As a final example of this particular sort, consider yet another familiar don­
key: 
(9) If a bishop meets another bishop, the one blesses the other 
Given the update procedures as they were sketched above, this sentence takes care 
of itself. 
9 Comparing Numbers 
Consider the following sequence of sentences: 
( 1 0) A man is walking in the park. Another man is walking in the park, too. The 
man is wearing blue suede shoes. 
12 1  
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Obviously, the continuation with the last sentence is infelicitous. Under the analysis 
proposed . here, this is easily accounted for: The uniqueness precondition of the definite is not fulfilled (nor can it be accommodated). 
An analysis of anaphoric definite descriptions in tenns of coindexing with a 
preceding tenn also has to impose a precondition on coindexing to be able to account 
for the infelicity of ( 10). If coindexing were free, as seems to be the case in Van 
Eijck's quantificational approach in [3], nothing would prevent an anaphoric link 
with just one of the preceding indefinites, rendering ( 1 0) ambiguous rather than out. 
Such problems seem inevitable for any account of anaphoric relations that freely 
coindexes an anaphor with a particular tenn as its antecedent. I S  
Heim's analysis (see [7]) of anaphoric definites avoids this problem, by 
fonnulating a precondition on coindexing. Casted in our terminology (and leaving 
salience out of the picture), it requires that there is a unique discourse item in the 
referent system of the infonnation state that satisfies the content of the description 
(or can be made to do so after accommodation). 
Clearly, in case Heim's precondition on the felicitous use of an anaphoric 
definite description is met, so is ours. But not the other way around. We require there 
to be a unique object in the context set, i .e., among the values of all discourse items 
in each possibility. The objects one finds in different possibilities, may be the values 
of different items. This freedom is not allowed for in Heim's non-quantificational 
coindexing approach, which can only link an anaphoric definite description with one 
particular preceding tenn. 
Above, we already met examples of (polyadic) anaphoric definite descrip­
tions for which it is impos�ible to make such links with specific earlier introduced 
discourse items. The following example shares this feature, but it concerns simple, 
non-polyadic, anaphoric definite descriptions. 
( I I )  Eva wrote down a number. She wrote down another number . . . .  She wrote 
down another number. She subtracted the smallest number from the largest 
one. 
Interpreting the tenns the smallest number and the largest number does not require 
that we be able to identify particular discourse items as satisfying their descriptive 
contents. The tenn the largest number has as its precondition that in each possibility 
there is among the objects in the context set of that possibility a number which 
is greater than all other numbers in the context set. Analogously for the smallest. 
(So, both the definite article as such, and the interpretation of largest and smallest 
involve contextually restricted quantification.) For the example in question, this 
precondition is easily met. 
But, surely, the largest number we find in the one possibility can be the value 
of one particular item (can be in the field in one particular column), whereas the 
largest number we find in another possibility can be the value of another item (can be 
in the field of another column). It is precisely this feature that prevents an analysis 
in tenns of coindexing an anaphoric definite description with a particular preceding 
indefinite. 
A Heimian analysis, which amounts to imposing this requirement as a pre-
Coreference and Contextually Restricted Quantification 
W2a Alf Bill W3a Alf Chris Alf 
W2b AIf Bill W3b Alf Chris Alf 
W2a Bill Alf W3a Bill Chris Bill 
W2b Bill Alf W3b Bill Chris Bill 
W3a AIf Bill W3a Chris Alf Alf 
W3b AIf Bill W3b Chris Alf Alf 
W3a AIf Chris W3a Chris Bill Bill 
W3b AIf Chris W3b Chris Bill Bill 
W3a Bill Alf 
W3b Bill Alf (b) 
W3a Bill Chris 
W3b Bill Chris 
W3a Chris Alf W3a Alf Chris Alf 
W3b Chris AIf W3b Bill Chris Bill 
W3a Chris Bill W3a Chris Alf Alf 
W3b Chris Bill W3b Chris Bill Bill 
(a) (c) 
Figure 5: A man walks in the park. Another man walks in the park, too. (a) The 
tallest man (b) is wearing a hat (c) 
condition on coindexing an anaphoric definite with a particular preceding indefinite, 
is hence not able to account for this type of example just like that. 
10 The Tallest Man 
A similar example, which can be treated in the same way, involves real men instead 
of mere numbers: 
( 1 2) A man is walking in the park. Another man is walking in the park, too. The 
tallest man is wearing a hat. 
It differs from the previous case, in that this example involves accommodation: 
unlike the relation larger than on the domain of numbers, the relation taller than on 
the domain of men is not connected. Accommodation involves the elimination of 
those possibilities in which the two men in the context set are equally tall. 
Suppose that on top of the information the agent had at the beginning of 
section 3, he furthermore knows that Alf and Bill are equally tall, and that both are 
taller than Chris. Besides that, he knows that either Alf or Bill is wearing a hat, but 
not Chris. So, instead of the four worlds depicted in Figure 1 a, the initial state of 
the agent now has to reckon with eight possibilities. Instead of world Wn o we get 
two worlds Wna and Wnb, where n reminds us of the number of men walking in the 
park, and the a or b indicate whether Alf or Bill is wearing a hat. 
. Figure 5 gives the relevant steps of updating the agents information state 
with ( 1 2). The precondition of the tallest man requires that the context set of a 
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possibility contains a man which is taller than the other men in that context set. 
Accommodating the precondition, no possibility from state Sa in wich the context 
set consists of Alf and Bill survives in 5b, since Alf and Bill are equally tall. This 
means that W2a and W2b are altogether eliminated, since there only Alf and Bill walk 
in the park. And possibilities containing W3a or W3b only survive if Chris is in the 
context set. 
The anaphoric definite description itself adds a third item, and in each pos­
sibility its field is filled with either Alf or Bill, since they are taller than Chris. Note 
that the third column is not identical to one of the earlier two. Its value sometimes 
comes from the one previous column, sometimes from the other. This is precisely 
why coindexing cannot work in cases like this, and why quantification is called for. 
Finally, in updating with the remaining part of the sentence, no further knowl­
edge about the world is obtained, only certain possible assignments are eliminated. 
However, this additional discourse knowledge may tum out to be of use in case 
the discourse continues. For example, where the speaker to continue with He is 
wearing blue suede shoes, too, the agent could eliminate the possibilities containing 
W3a , since only Bill is wearing blue suede shoes. This leaves only one world in the 
agents information state, world W3b, which means that the agent knows all there is 
to know about who are walking in the park, and who is wearing what. Provided, of 
course, that the information he got was correct in the first place. 
11 The Man and the Doctor 
As we noted, the interpretation procedure for anaphoric definite descriptions outlined 
in section 5 stands in need of further refinement. Consider the following type of 
example: 
( 1 3) A man came to the doctor. The man said: " . . . ". 
Although we may have to reckon with the possibility that the man relates to the 
doctor, by far the most likely interpretation of ( 1 3) is that the man is anaphorically 
linked to a man. The current treatment does not account for this. 
Without accommodation, the sentence would be declared out, since there 
will be possibilities in which the context set contains two men. Allowing for accom­
modation, the result is that all possibilities in which the doctor is male are eliminated. 
For in order to arrive at a unique man in each possibility, as the precondition for 
anaphoric definite decriptions requires, we would have to infer from the second 
sentence that the doctor is a woman. Both options certainly are not in accordance 
with intuitions. 
Do examples like ( 1 3) then show that the proposed analysis is untenable? 
We do not think so. But what they do show is that the analysis is in need of further 
refinement. Information states need to be extended with more structured and detailed 
representations of discourse information. 
In principle there are two ways to assure that the uniqueness condition works 
in cases such as these. One is to allow only part of the context set to be taken into 
consideration. The other option is to add further features to the items as such, and to 
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make the uniqueness requirement sensitive to these features. The overall effect will 
be the same in both cases: it becomes easier to fulfill the uniqueness requirement. 
Probably, both strategies are called for. As for the first option, it does seem 
likely that merely having a list of discourse items is not sufficient. Discourse itself 
is not just a list of phrases, but has a much more intricate structure. More of this 
structure should be reflected in the way in which its discourse items are ordered. 
Consequently, the referent system may consist of different layers of discourse items. 
One could look upon this as an implementation of part of the notorious notion of 
salience, discourse items in a higher layer being more salient than ones lower down. 
Then, the uniqueness precondition need not search through the set of all items, but 
may be restricted to the items available up to a certain level. 
However, it does not seem very likely that the strategy just outlined would 
work for the type of example ( 1 3). It is far from clear that after having processed 
the first sentence the man is more salient than the doctor. Rather, what seems to be 
important in this case is that the descriptive contents of the definite the man and the 
indefinite a man are much more alike than those of the doctor and the man: the item 
corresponding to a man is more salient as an object fitting that description, i.e., as a 
man, than the item corresponding to the doctor. 
This brings us to the second strategy distinguished above: adding more 
features of discourse information to the items as such. As things stand, discourse 
information is not sensitive to the descriptive content by means of which the items 
are introduced. If this kind of discourse information would be added, the uniqueness 
precondition could be made sensitive to it, and give the right outcome for cases like 
( 1 3). 
One could then formulate the search procedure in such a way that items that 
do not fit the contents of the description as well as others may be ignored. The 
measure of fit can be determined from the values of the items in the information 
state as a whole. For example, in case of ( 1 3) one will probably find women among 
the possible values of the item introduced by the doctor. And even if all the doctors 
are men (according to the information of the agent), the item introduced by a man 
would still show a better match, as long as not all men are doctors. 
Of course, the details need to be spelled out, but it seems not unlikely that if 
discourse information is refined along these lines, examples such as ( 13) need not 
obstruct the kind of quantificational approach proposed here. 
A final remark: the strategies outlined above do not necessarily result in 
deterministic procedures: sometimes equally good solutions for the resolution of an 
anaphor might result. But then, that seems true to life: even in case of ( 1 3) the man 
may turn out to be the doctor, and not the man. 
12 Conclusion 
Apart from the empirical differences noted above, Heim's approach and the one 
proposed in this paper also differ in ontology. 
Heim-following Karttunen in this-is a representative of the more general 
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theoretical move to dissociate coreference from reference to the same real object, and 
to introduce formal objects-discourse referents, file cards, discourse items, pegs­
and take coreference to consist in being related to the same such formal object. 
The analysis of coreference proposed here, brings coreference back to real 
reference to objects, within contextually restricted domains. The formal objects, 
discourse items, still have a role to play, though: their possible values, which are 
real objects, determine the context sets that quantification can be restricted to. 
We hope to have adduced some evidence that the move back from formal 
coreference (coindexing, really) to real coreference may pay its way, by providing 
a more adequate and uniform account, not only of anaphoric definite descriptions, 
but also of other anaphoric elements. However, whether this uniform approach can 
be maintained throughout remains to be seen. 
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Notes 
1. The term 'anaphoric' is used here in a liberal way. It is not narrowly restricted 
to cases where an expression can be linked via coindexing with a preceding phrase. 
It applies to all cases where·an expression is used in such a way that its interpretation 
depends on one or more foregoing phrases. 
2. We do not claim that all anaphoric terms can be treated in this way. In particular, 
in keeping with previous work, we will assume in what follows that (singular) 
anaphoric pronouns are treated by means of coindexing, i.e., as bound variables, 
where the dynamics of the binding mechanism allows for variables to be bound 
outside the syntactic scope of a quantifier. 
3. Pictures can be illuminating. But they can also easily mislead. Representing 
information states as simple matrices has its limitations. It suggests that informa­
tion states are small, finite objects, whereas in fact they are usually infinite. It is 
also important to keep in mind that-unlike the boxes of Discourse Representation 
Theory-the matrices do not represent discourse, but depict the result of interpreting 
discourse. They are filled with model theoretic objects, represented in the metalan­
guage, not with expressions of the object language. 
4. We do not take into consideration here that there is also the possibility that 
'discourse' items come to life by other means than explicit discourse. For example, 
the salient presence of an object in the visual field shared by two or more agents 
may lead to the creation of a discourse item, too. 
Furthermore, it may happen that, although an item is not explicitly introduced by 
the discourse, it is implicitly 'present' on the basis of what has been said. The latter 
may be thought to occur in case of the anaphoric use of the definite the captain, after 
Coreference and Contextually Restricted Quantification 
one has talked about a ship, without explicitly having mentioned its captain. See [ 1 ]  
for an analysis of implicit arguments in a dynamic setting. 
S. In other papers, we refer to discourse items as 'pegs' .  Apart from this termi­
nological variation, what is left out of consideration here is that the referent system 
also keeps track of which variables of the logical language are in active use, and 
with which peg they are associated. The matrices also do not show that there is a 
difference between rows and columns. Information states are sets of possibilities. 
Hence the order of the rows is irrelevant. The possibilities themselves, however, are 
ordered, in the sense that the order of the columns reflects the order in which the 
discourse items are introduced. I.e., the discourse items can be identified with their 
column number. (Indeed, pegs are identified with numbers.) 
6. It is not that essential to the example, but the description of the information of 
the agent is to be taken in such a way that it is about objects, about the interpretations 
of expressions of the object language. E.g., the way we described the information, 
is to be understood in such a way that the agent may very well not know which of 
the three men is called Alf, which one is called Bill, or which one is called Chris. 
In our description of the information of the agent, 'Alf', 'Bill' and 'Chris' function 
as expressions of the metalanguage to name these three objects. They are not the 
homophonous names of the language that the agent shares with other agents. 
7. Obviously, the procedure as it is described in the text needs further refinement. 
See the discussion in section 1 1 . 
8. If a state contains two indistinguishable items, this is a good reason for cleansing 
it by discarding one of the two. Doing so saves space and can make no difference 
for whatever update is still to follow. 
9. It is well known that here are cases of binding across conditionals. But at 
present, we stick to this oversimplification. 
10. So, for better or worse, the proposed analysis does not predict strong unique­
ness effects. However, what is predicted is that if non-uniqueness is explicitly 
communicated, there is a difference. Consider: 
( 14) Alf is a farmer. He owns a donkey. He owns another donkey. Every farmer 
who owns a donkey, beats the donkey that he owns. 
According to the present analysis, no information state will accept this sequence. 
The indefinites in the second and third sentences will introduce two donkey-items 
in the information state, such that in every possibility two different donkeys are 
assigned to these items. But this means that by the time we meet the anaphoric 
definite description the donkey that he owns, the precondition that there is exactly 
one donkey among the values of the discourse items is not fulfilled in each possibility. 
(And neither can it be accommodated.) 
So, what is predicted is that informants will have no problems in accepting sentence 
(3), in case they consider it possible that some men beat more than one donkey, i.e., if 
uniqueness is not part of the information about the world. However, in case the non­
uniqueness has been turned into discourse information, having created possibilities 
with more than one donkey among the values of the discourse items, informants will 
judge the sentence to be incorrect in that context. 
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This is what the analysis predicts. However, for obvious reasons, it seems a predic­
tion that is rather difficult to test by eliciting judgments from informants. 
11. From a technical point of view, there are two basic mechanisms available 
to deal with anaphoric relations within update semantics. The one is coindexing, 
the other is contextually restricted dynamic quantification, which is what we are 
discussing here. (Combinations of the two, are also possible. The term his mother 
in example (4) may provide a case in point.) 
As far as pronouns are concerned, it is not obvious to us which of the two techniques 
is to be preferred. If we treat pronouns as quantifiers rather than variables, (3) and 
(5) can be made fully equivalent. The question that arises is whether they are indeed 
equivalent. For example, if we replace the definite the donkey that he owns by it in 
the discourse in the previous note, does that make a difference, or not? Likewise, is 
there a difference in acceptability (the potential to be accommodated) between the 
following sequences? 
( 1 5) A doctor came in. Another doctor came in. The man said to the woman . . .  
( 1 6) A doctor came in. Another doctor came in. He said to her . . .  
If ( 15) is judged to be better than ( 16), this judgment could be used as evidence 
in favour of treating pronouns by means of coindexing. If one feels little or no 
difference, that might be evidence in favour of a quantificational approach. 
12. Continuing on the remark made in note 8, here one meets another reason for 
cleansing information states. Since after processing (6), the two discourse items 
are qualitatively indistinguishable, there is little use in keeping these two separate 
items. It would do just as .well to have a single item instead, the value of which 
in each possibility is the set consisting of the two men in question. This would 
halve the number of possibilities in state 4c, since the order in which the two have 
been introduced is irrelevant. Apart from being more economic, the effect of such 
a cleansing operation would make no difference. 
We abstain from actually performing such cleansing operations, since the formal 
system on the background is not yet attuned to plural reference. 
13. Notice the difference between (6) and ( 17). 
( 1 7) A man entered the room. Another man entered the room. 
Unlike (6), it is most natural to interpret ( 17) as a description of two subsequent 
events. In that case, as participants in two different events, the two men are qualita­
tively different, which does make it possible to anaphorically refer back to just one 
of them using a description such as the man who entered first or, simply the first and 
the second. 
Another case in point is: 
( 1 8) Look! A man is walking in the park. Look! Another man is walking in the 
park, too. 
Both men are apparently located in the visual field of the speech participants, and 
hence are distinguishable. That is why here, too, a definite description can be used 
to refer to a particular one of these two men. For example, one could continue ( 1 8) 
with The first one is my brother. Such a continuation would be out in case of (6), 
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under the assumption that there is no additional information, visual or otherwise, 
from outside the discourse that qualitatively distinguishes between the two men. 
In case of ( 1 8) the indefinites are used referentially: for each of the discourse items 
introduced by them, its value is the same in each possibility, since -by assumption­
the object is observationally present. (See[5, 8] .) 
14. According to certain stylistic rules for English the the one . . .  the other con­
struction is bad, and the one . . .  and the other constructions is to be preferred. (In 
Dutch, by the way, the preference is precisely the other way around.) Unlike the 
former construction, the latter need not be analyzed as a polyadic quantifier. One 
can interpret one as contextually restricted existential quantification, and the other 
as the x such that x * y, where y is to be the variable introduced by one. So, in the 
analysis of the other one has to use both contextually restricted quantification, and 
coindexing in accounting for its anaphoric impact. 
15. This holds also when quantification is restricted to context sets, as in Van der 
Does [2]. 
References 
[ 1 ]  Dekker, P. , 1995, Existential Disclosure, Linguistics and Philosophy, 1 8  
[2] Does, J. van der, 1994, Formalizing E-Type Anaphora, in P. Dekker & M. 
Stokhof (eds), Proceedings o/the Ninth Amsterdam Colloquium, n..LC, Am­
sterdam 
[3] Eijck, J. van, 1993, The Dynamics of Description, Journal 0/ Semantics, 
10(2) 
[4] Groenendijk, J., M. Stokhof and F. Veltman, 1994b, This Might Be It, in D. 
Westerstabl and J. Seligman (eds), Language, Logic and Computation: The 
1994 Moraga proceedings, CSLI, Stanford 
[5] Groenendijk, J., M. Stokhof andF. Veltman, 1995, Coreference and Modality 
in the Context of Multi-Speaker Discourse, ms 
[6] Groenendijk, J., M. Stokhof andF. Veltman, 1995, Coreference and Modality, 
in S. Lappin (ed), Handbook o/Contemporary Semantic Theory, Blackwell, 
Oxford, 1995 
[7] Heim, 1. ,  1 982, The Semantics o/Definite and Indefinite Noun Phrases, Ph.D. 
thesis, University of Massachusetts, Amherst 
[8] Ludlow, P., and S. Neale, 199 1 ,  Indefinite Descriptions: In Defense of Rus­
sell, Linguistics and Philosophy, 14(2) 
[9] Neale, S., 1993, Descriptions, MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass. 
[ 10] Westerstabl, D., 199 1 ,  Determiners and Context Sets, in J. van Benthem & 
A. Ter Meulen (eds), Generalized Quantifiers in Natural Language, Foris, 
Dordrecht 
129 
